We examine the effect of democracy as an institutional context on individuals' perceptions of government corruption. To do so, we compile an integrated dataset from the Asian, Afro, and Latino Barometer surveys and use a hierarchical linear regression model. Our primary finding is that the effect of democracy has different effects on ordinary citizens' perceptions of corruption in different contexts. In general, people in countries with higher levels of democracy tend to perceive their governments to be more corrupt. However, more importantly, conditional models show that in countries with more developed democratic institutions, individuals with stronger democratic values are less likely to perceive the government to be corrupt. Moreover, people in such countries are less likely to assess their government based on their perceptions of economic situation.
Introduction
The existing literature on democracy and corruption focuses on whether and how democracy influences government corruption in reality. 1 In this study, we turn our attention to a much-neglected area in this stream of literature: the impact of democracy on citizens' perceptions of corruption. We do so for two reasons: First, most extant studies of the effect of democracy on presumed actual corruption in fact use perceptions rather than corruption per se as the dependent variable (mainly using CPI 2 and WGI 3 ).
Some scholars even contend that the real degree of corruption, which CPI and other measures intend to capture, cannot be measured directly due to the secretive nature of corruption and the complex criteria for corruption across countries/cultures. 4 Scholars also are aware that perception-based indices for measuring corruption cannot clearly differentiate the reality of corruption from perceptions of corruption. 5 As Treisman 6 suggests that "'perceived corruption' may reflect many other things besides the phenomenon itself".
Second, people's perceptions of corruption are of critical importance because of their erosive effect on political trust and political legitimacy. 7 They are important for both authoritative regimes and democracies. 8 As Warren 9 states, " [corruption] undermines democratic capacities of association within civil society by generalizing suspicion and eroding trust and reciprocity." Based on empirical research of Latin America, scholars also have found that perceptions of corruption can create political skepticism, which, in turn, causes citizens to withdraw from public engagement. Further, perceptions of corruption weaken civil societies by "reinforce[ing] the technocratic and delegative features of many democracies." 10 Given the importance of citizens' perceptions of government corruption and the inadequate scholarly attention devoted to the effect of democracy on corruption perceptions, in this study, we examine how democracy as a macro-institutional context affects individuals' perceptions of corruption. Specifically, we argue that in addition to its direct effect on people's perceptions of corruption, democracy promotes more favorable views of government integrity by moderating the relationship between perceptions of corruption and their correlates at the individual level.
The two correlates we concern in this study are democratic values and economic perceptions. On the one hand, through institutional supply, democracy satisfies the needs of democratically oriented citizens and thus mitigates the harmful effect of democratic values on perceptions of government. On the other hand, by blurring the boundaries of government institutions' responsibilities through a separation and balance of power, democracy also attenuates the negative effect of economic distress on individuals' assessments of government integrity. In other words, people become less instrumental in a more democratic country. In short, democracy reduces the effect of the factors at the individual level that may cause people to view the government as corruptive.
Our study makes three contributions to the literature on corruption. First, it extends the literature to the individual level. Aside from the necessity of such a measurement, as argued above, a measurement at the individual level helps to avoid the problems of aggregate measurements of actual government corruption. 11 Second, our study identifies some mechanisms through which democracy contributes to more positive perceptions of government among citizens. We argue that the effect of a greater supply of democratic institutions in generating positive perceptions of the government is not direct or unmediated. Instead, the effect manifests by reshaping the relationship between perceptions of corruption and their determinants, namely, democratic values and economic perceptions.
Third, we test the contextual and moderating effect of democracy by using combined data from three Barometer Surveys, i.e., the Asia Barometer, the Afro Barometer (Africa), and the Latino Barometer (Latin America). This combined dataset covers the largest number of countries (50 countries) outside western democracies, with varying levels of democracy. Although the different Barometer Surveys have coordinated their efforts by including some common questions, little effort has been made to utilize these questions in an analysis of individual attitudes.
Theory and Hypotheses
In recent years, studies of comparative politics have combined variances across macro institutions and social structures with those of micro individual behavior and opinions by using multilevel analyses. 12 This research approach is based on the concept of "nested citizens": "People are nested in identifiable contexts-that is, they form attitudes and make choices in variable macro-political (or other) environments (or contexts)." 13 Following Anderson and Singer's argument, the effect of contextual factors (democracy in this study) on citizens' attitudes and behaviors (corruption perceptions in this study)
can be parsed into direct and conditional (or contingent) effects.
Democracy and perceptions of corruption: The direct effect
Although extant discussions of the effect of democracy on corruption are often intended to link democracy to corruption in reality, we borrow the insights of them to build our expectation with regard to the effect of democracy on corruption in perceptions.
Presumably, a more corruptive government in reality should correlate with a population of citizens with perceptions of a higher level of government corruption. Conventionally, democracy is believed to be able to reduce public officials' opportunities to misuse discretion by pluralizing political power, enhancing the transparency of policy decisions, and increasing officials' accountability to the electorate. Some empirical studies have confirmed such a corruption-reducing effect of democracy.
14 However, such a finding faces two challenges. First, given the problem of measuring corruption, these studies actually use corruption perceptions, most often those of elites or experts, as the dependent variable to proxy for the reality of corruption, and such a practice has not been well justified. Given the importance of corruption perceptions themselves, we in this study directly explore how ordinary citizens living in democratic contexts perceive government differently from those living in non-democratic regimes through a cross-national study of individual attitudes.
Second, in the literature of the relationship between democracy and corruption, many more scholars have pointed out how both corruption in reality and in perceptions 6 can actually increases in democracies. 15 According to Rose-Akerman, 16 for instance, three factors of a democratic polity are responsible for politicians' involvement in political corruption: the existence of narrow benefits available for distribution by politicians, the ability of wealthy groups to obtain these benefits legally, and the existence of constraints on politicians generated by their desire for reelection. Further, Johnston pointed out that in four types of corruption, three can occur in democracies:
influence market" corruption, "elite cartels" corruption, and "oligarchs and clans" corruption 17 When the scope expands to non-democracies, the ability of democracy to mitigate corruption becomes even more debatable. In large-N global comparative studies, the effect of democracy on corruption is mixed, with some research finding no significant 21 Empirical studies from Latin American democracies told a similar story.
As argued by Keefer, 22 the inability of politicians (especially emerging political competitors in younger democracies) to make credible promises to citizens drives politicians to build their own patron-client networks and thus to engage in rent-seeking activities. 23 In addition, democracy directly increases mass perceptions of corruption through its core institutional arrangement-election and political competition. Scholars of U.S.
electoral campaigns have found that political contests can be incredibly dirty-the closer the race is, the meaner the campaign is. 24 With such campaigns, exposure of corruption is often used as a tool to undermine and discredit political opponents. From an instrumental-rational perspective, citizens' perceptions of corruption can be influenced by their self-evaluation of economic situation. People will likely to believe that their government is less corrupt when their economic situation is good. This rationale is often used to explain why voters tend to condone corrupt politicians. 30 Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 31 found that Greeks somewhat accept the exchange between a certain level of corruption and economic benefits. Further, Zechmeister and
Zizumbo-Colunga 32 show that "individuals facing bad (good) collective economic conditions apply a higher (lower) penalty to presidential approval for perceived corruption."
H2a: Perceptions of a better economic situation are associated with perceptions of a lower level of government corruption.
We further argue that the impact of economic perceptions on perceived corruption is not uniform across national borders. Rather, the relative magnitude of this effect depends on the regime's supply of democracy. Specifically, we argue that the regime's supply of democratic institutions significantly and positively moderates the negative impact of individuals' economic perceptions on perceived government corruption. That is, while a worse economic situation increases corruption perceptions, it does so more in autocracies than in democracies. This moderating effect occurs because the very design of democratic institutions renders economic success or failure attributable less to the regime itself and more to incumbent political leaders. Moreover, democratic regimes dampen political actors' dissatisfaction with the regime "by institutionalizing opportunities for leadership and policy change." 33 Therefore, in a functioning democracy, economic hardships are less likely to be connected with citizens' perceptions of corruption.
In a sharp contrast to the situation in democratic countries, economic responsibility in authoritarian countries is more closely associated with the regime itself. A key characteristic of authoritarian regimes is the natural fusion of the ruling elites with the regime. In most non-democratic countries, governments monopolize economic sources and abuse political power to intervene in market transactions. Citizens and businesspersons have no viable channels by which to influence political decision making, and the economic elites have no choice but to buy policies by bribing public officials or building patron-client networks with politicians. Accordingly, when considering economic performance, citizens in non-democracies are less able to distinguish between the incumbents and the regime; thus, they readily attribute their economic well-being to the malignancy or benignancy of the regime. Moi's regime was marred by corruption, which was believed to arise from Kenyan pseudo democratic institutions. 40 Another key aspect of the impact of individuals' democratic values concerns the quality of democratic institutions, in which integrity is a salient dimension. 41 In regimes with basic democratic institutions, democracy can be strengthened by building democratic institutions. Individuals with strong democratic values will hence be more satisfied in more mature democracies than in low-quality democracies with flawed democratic institutions. Therefore, the erosive effect of democratic values on government legitimacy would be much weaker in a mature democracy than in a low-quality democracy. That is, the magnitude of the positive impact of democratic values on perceptions of corruption would be decreased by democratic institutions that serve as the regime context. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3b: The positive association between democratic values and corruption
perceptions is weaker in democracies compared to autocracies.
Data and Variables

Data
To examine the relationship between democracy and individuals' perceptions of government corruption, we compile a dataset on developing countries from three We select the recent datasets that were compiled in the same year or in adjacent years: 
Political democracy
To ensure that our analytical results are not driven by the choice of a particular measurement of democracy, we use two widely used datasets on democracy:
"Democracy and Dictators" (DD) and Polity IV. DD is a dichotomous measurement of democracy updated from the "Political and Economic Database." 45 are asked whether they reject one-man rule, one-party rule, or military rule. 47 In the LBS, two questions capture whether respondents reject one-man rule or one-party rule. 48 We average the responses to these questions and generate a composite index of democratic values ranging from 0 for lowest democratic orientation to 1 for highest democratic orientation. We fully acknowledge that this index does not comprehensively capture ones' democratic orientations. We are not able to obtain a more comprehensive measurement due to the lack of coherent questions asked in three Barometer surveys. But at the same time, we believe that our measurement suffices to gauge democratic values. In particular, the three questions asked in this index concern the procedural and institutional aspects of a political system. Such an index avoids the problem that directly questions about the norms of democracy might induce socially desired answers. Moreover, the measurements of democracy (namely, DD and Polity IV) we use in this study mainly focuses on democratic institutions and procedures.
Self-economic evaluations are directly measured by responses to questions in all three surveys. Respondents are asked to describe their present economic situations.
Responses are given on a 5-point scale and are recoded such that higher scores indicate better economic situations.
Control variables
At the individual level, we include necessary socio-demographic factors that are recorded in all three surveys: gender, age, and education level. We also include the frequency of 49 to control for its effects on citizens' corruption perceptions. In recent years, the Internet has come to play a pivotal role in political communication. From the Internet, people can acquire various types of negative news about the government, including scandals of political corruption. We also control for interpersonal trust. 50 Individuals who tend to trust others are more likely to trust public officials. 51 Therefore, we expect interpersonal trust to decrease citizens' perceptions of government corruption.
Internet use
At to the previous year and 0 otherwise. For the sake of brevity, a full discussion of our expectations regarding the effects of these variables is omitted. We take the values of all the aggregate-level variables in the same survey year of the three Barometer Surveys. 
Statistical Models and Findings
To test our hypotheses, we use a HLM. One of the key advantages of a multilevel model is that it enables not only a more accurate estimation of the additive effects of both the individual and contextual correlates but also the estimation of cross-level interactions between contextual factors and individual factors. Table 2 presents the results of the regression using this method. In the other five models of Table 2 (Models 2-6), we use Polity IV as the measurement of democracy and examine its relationship with perceptions of corruption.
In Substantively, this result suggests that an individual with a certain level of democratic orientation is less likely to perceive a government to be corrupt in a country with a higher level of democracy than in other countries.
In Model 3, we use the same strategy to include the interaction between individual self-economic evaluations and democracy. The results also confirm our expectations.
Economic evaluations have a significant negative effect on individual corruption perceptions. The coefficient of the cross-level interaction of Polity IV and economic evaluations is positive and statistically significant. This result indicates that democracy mitigates the negative effect of economic evaluations on perceived corruption.
Substantively, this result suggests that a higher level of democracy in a country renders its citizens less likely to judge the government based on their own economic situation.
We include both interaction terms simultaneously in Model To further show the robustness of our findings from the models presented in Table 2, we use DD as an alternative measurement of democracy and conduct the same set of hierarchical linear regressions. The results presented in Table 3 (Models 7-11) are fully consistent with those from the models presented in Table 2 . Hence, all of our hypotheses are confirmed by the second set of regression models. Table 4 presents the results. It shows that democracy has no direct effect on actual level of corruption since neither Polity IV nor DD is significantly associated with CPI at p = 0.05. When measured as DD, democracy increases real corruption level at p = 0.10. Democracy, however, as also indicated in analysis of Table 2 and Table 3 , is positively associated with corruption perceptions. That is, with a higher level of democracy, citizens on average perceive the government to be more corruptive.
In short, both sets of analyses indicate the harmful effect of democracy on corruption in both reality and perceptions. 
Conclusions and Implications
Although existing studies suggest that democracy drives trust in government, this article depicts dual effects of democracy on perceptions of government corruption. Treating the institutional supply of democracy both as a direct determinant and as the contextual condition of citizens' perceptions of government corruption, we find that democracy plays a dual role in affecting ordinary citizens' perceptions of corruption, as indicated in our analysis of cross-national surveys from East Asia, Africa, and Latin America. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
